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IntroductIon1
Within the conflict and security studies litera-
ture, the study of bombings and other forms 
* The Spanish version of this article can be consulted at 
http://reis.cis.es and http://reis.metapress.com
1 I am grateful for comments to previous versions of this 
article to Andrés Santana, Elisabeth Wood, Paloma Aguilar, 
and two REIS anonymous reviewers. The research in tis 
article has benefited from funding by the Centro de Inves-
of so-called «indirect» violence has very often 
been dissociated from local political factors. 
The use of this type of violence, which since 
WWII has been frequent in any war where ar-
med groups have heavy artillery and aerial 
technology at their disposal2, has usually 
tigaciones Sociológicas (CIS), in particular through the grant 
Ayuda a la Finalización de Tesis Doctorales (2009).
2 The use of air weaponry became widespread during 
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Abstract
This article analyzes variation in bombings during conventionally fought 
civil wars. It establishes a number of hypotheses based on a theoretical 
framework that emphasizes the role of political factors in accounting 
for violence. In addition, it takes into account emotional factors such as 
citizens’ revenge aspirations. The hypotheses are tested with data on 
bombings perpetrated by the Francoist side in 1,062 municipalities of 
Catalonia during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). The results confirm 
that the aerial strikes are positively related to local political support 
for the rival group in the pre-war democratic elections, as well as to 
executions perpetrated by the rival group during the war. The former is 
consistent with the political hypothesis; the latter is consistent with the 
revenge hypothesis. 
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Resumen
Este artículo analiza la variación en los bombardeos que tienen lugar 
durante guerras civiles de tipo convencional. Se plantean varias hipó-
tesis partiendo de un marco teórico que pone el acento en el papel de 
los factores políticos para explicar la violencia. Además, se tienen en 
cuenta factores emocionales como las aspiraciones de venganza de los 
ciudadanos. Las hipótesis se ponen a prueba mediante datos sobre los 
bombardeos perpetrados por el bando franquista en 1.062 municipios 
de Cataluña durante la Guerra Civil española (1936-1939). Los resulta-
dos confirman que los ataques aéreos tienen una relación positiva con 
el apoyo local al bando contrario en las elecciones democráticas de 
preguerra, así como con las ejecuciones perpetradas por el grupo rival 
durante la guerra. El primer resultado coincide con la hipótesis política; 
el segundo, con la hipótesis de la venganza.
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been regarded as a mere warfare tactic, un-
connected with politics. In the context of civil 
wars, bombings have mainly been understo-
od as either a bargaining strategy or as a tac-
tic for armed groups to win territories; for 
example, they have not been regarded as a 
tactic to annihilate particular groups of indivi-
duals3. In the context of interstate wars, 
bombings against civilians have been consi-
dered instrumental both from the perspective 
of eliminating the enemy’s resources and in 
terms of morally diminishing it (Friedrich, 
2006). Spatial variation of bombings has ra-
rely been accounted for in any of these 
approaches. 
In this paper, I introduce local politics into 
the study of bombings, and I focus on con-
ventional civil wars (hereafter also CCW), 
which I argue have been rather overlooked in 
the civil war literature. Following recent work 
(Balcells and Kalyvas, 2010), I distinguish 
CCW from irregular and symmetric non-con-
ventional civil wars. The main dimension 
along which these civil wars are distinguished 
is the technology used both by rebel groups 
and incumbents. In CCW, there is a military 
symmetry between the two sides: they are 
fought between incumbents and insurgents 
using heavy artillery. Consequently, CCW 
«have clear frontlines, where attacks take pla-
ce mostly from barricades and stable posi-
tions, and in which there are big major battles 
that are usually determinants for the war 
outcomes» (Kalyvas, 2005). One of the main 
differences between CCW and irregular or 
guerrilla wars is that —except for territories 
that are extremely close to the frontline— the 
control of the armed groups over the popula-
World War II, thanks to the technological development 
during World War I (Overy, 1980). According to Stanley 
Payne, the Spanish Civil War was the first conflict of the 
20th century in which the air force played an essential 
role (Payne, 2010: 471).
3 Particularly so in the case of violence taking place du-
ring conventional conflict, and less so in the case of vio-
lence taking place during irregular wars (Kocher et al., 
2011).
tion is overwhelming in all the localities in their 
«zone». In irregular civil wars, areas of total 
control are much scarcer, smaller and less 
stable. This implies that whereas violence 
against civilians in irregular wars is the likely 
result of warfare itself and the competition to 
achieve territory (Mao Zedong, 1978; Valenti-
no et al., 2004; Kalyvas, 2006; Vargas, 2009), 
such violence in CCW is not so connected 
with the military struggle, as it takes place in 
a space separated from the battlefield (i.e. ci-
ties, towns, villages with no combatants)4.
The theory presented here draws from a 
broader context, and it belongs to a wider 
research agenda which also considers other 
forms of wartime violence and other types of 
civil wars (Balcells, 2010a). This paper, howe-
ver, focuses on indirect violence which takes 
place during conventional civil wars. I argue 
that, contrary to what is usually thought, 
bombardments and other forms of indirect 
violence (usually regarded as indiscrimina-
te violence) display some degree of selectivi-
ty; in other words, these attacks may delibe-
rately target collectivities or groups of people; 
thus, they are not necessarily indiscriminate. 
This has clear-cut implications for the factors 
that have to be taken into consideration when 
trying to understand variation in indirect vio-
lence across space and time. In this paper, I 
theorize about these factors, and I present 
observable implications that are tested with 
data on bombings that took place in Catalo-
nia during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). 
theoretIcal framework
In this paper, I refer to a typology that distin-
guishes between direct and indirect violence 
during civil war (Balcells, 2011; 2010a). They 
are both intentional forms of violence, and 
the main dimension over which they diverge 
4 Kalyas’s (2006) seminal theory on violence in civil war 
does not apply to conventional civil wars, as it is based 
on irregular conflict. 
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is their technology of production. Direct vio-
lence is defined as violence that is perpetra-
ted with light weaponry (e.g. guns, knives, 
shotguns, machetes) in a face-to-face type of 
interaction between perpetrator and victim. 
This includes, for example, individual or mass 
executions. Because armed groups usually 
require collaboration (e.g. information, help to 
find suspects) from civilians of a locality in 
order to perpetrate direct violence, its pro-
duction is characterized by depending upon 
civilian agency, in addition to that of armed 
groups. Indirect violence, in contrast, con-
sists of violence perpetrated with heavy we-
aponry (e.g. tanks, fighter planes), which 
does not require face-to-face interaction with 
the victims. Because of its technology of pro-
duction, indirect violence is unilateral from 
the side of the group, giving very limited 
agency (if any) to civilians5. Furthermore, in-
direct violence may be perpetrated in areas 
where the armed group has no territorial con-
trol (e.g. through aerial strikes). This makes 
indirect violence fundamentally different from 
direct violence, as the latter can only be per-
petrated under conditions of presence of the 
group in the territory inhabited by its would-
be targets.
What explains indirect violence during ci-
vil war? More specifically: why do armed 
groups decide to target certain places and 
not others? The literature on International Re-
lations and International Security has focu-
sed mainly on studying bombings in order to 
understand the relationship between violence 
against civilians and the determinacy to win 
and coercion (Pape, 1996; Horowitz and Rei-
ter, 2001). For example, Arreguín-Toft argues 
that in asymmetric conflict, by means of bar-
barism (i.e. attacking civilians) the strong ac-
tor seeks to coerce its weaker opponent into 
changing its behavior by inflicting pain (des-
troying its values). This strategy has been 
5 For example, civilians cannot veto a bomb being 
dropped from a plane or a missile being fired from a tank. 
used to destroy an adversary’s will and capa-
city to fight (2001: 102). Instances of indirect 
violence are usually considered intrinsically 
indiscriminate, and they are assumed to be 
related to these coercive strategies. As a 
consequence of this, the literature has focu-
sed mostly on the consequences of violence 
for war outcomes, and has not provided us 
clear-cut predictions on the location and ti-
ming of violence within a single conflict. Mo-
reover, in the context of an interstate war, 
since all civilians on the enemy side can be 
considered supporters of the enemy (Frie-
drich, 2006), they can all be considered 
equally susceptible to being targeted; thus, 
aside from tactical and strategic factors, we 
have no a priori reasons to think that some 
localities should be more intensively targeted 
than others6.
The civil war literature is not much more 
helpful in providing us with explanations for 
variation in indirect violence. The literature on 
counterinsurgency has tended to focus on 
the impact of indiscriminate violence on civi-
lian behavior (Kalyvas, 2006; Lyall, 2009; Ko-
cher et al., 2011), coming to the conclusion 
that this violence is generally counterproduc-
tive. While not referring exclusively to this 
type of violence, authors who have focused 
on the determinants of civilian victimization 
have argued that it is related to the balance 
of power between contenders (Ziemke, 2008; 
Hultman, 2007; Vargas, 2009; Boyle, 2009). 
Ziemke (2008) argues that massacres are 
perpetrated in order to drastically resolve the 
war, and she predicts to reach the highest 
levels in the latter stages of a war, and to in-
crease with the length of the war. She also 
argues that greater losses on the battlefield 
lead to increased civilian victimization. Simi-
larly, Hultman (2007) predicts more intense 
6 Only recently have some works referred to elimination-
ist victimization during interstate war, which tends to 
occur in wars of territorial annexation and is aimed at 
removing members of a target group from a certain piece 
of territory (Downes, 2008; Downes and Chochran, 2010). 
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violence against civilians by rebels when they 
are losing on the battlefield. She argues that 
this violence works as a «cheap and easy» 
military strategy to raise the government’s 
costs for standing firm and continuing fighting 
(Hultman, 2007: 206). Vargas (2009) predicts 
violence to be greater when there is a shift in 
the balance of power, as violence is instru-
mental for bargaining purposes. While all the-
se approaches are somewhat helpful in un-
derstanding temporal variation in violence, 
they are not able to explain spatial variation 
in violence7. Many of these works are also 
limited in that they are either explicitly or im-
plicitly inspired by the nature of warfare in 
irregular conflicts. In CCW, the distinction 
between combatants and noncombatants is 
clearer than in irregular wars (Balcells, 2011; 
Kalyvas and Balcells, 2010), so the bombing 
of rearguard territories is likely to generate a 
relatively larger share of civilian victims; I ar-
gue that this makes bombings in CCW con-
siderably less due to military factors, although 
these obviously also play a role8. 
Following previous work, I argue that 
when violence against civilians takes place in 
the rearguard territories of CCW, this is moti-
vated by the determination of armed groups 
to clear these territories of «strong enemies», 
that is, people who have strong identities due 
to prewar mobilization. In CCW, when there 
is no prewar political mobilization, violence 
against civilians is irrational from the side of 
the armed group (Balcells, 2011; 2010b). If 
armed groups’ resources are limited, why 
would they use them to attack civilian popu-
lations in zones under full control of the ene-
my forces? Unless this occurs near the front-
7 An exception is Boyle (2009), who derives implications 
for spatial variation in violence in the current conflict in 
Iraq (i.e. they are conditional on the ethnic composition 
of localities). 
8 Obviously, in any civil war «both parties to a conflict 
will target strategic locations such as crossroads, bridg-
es, ports and airports held by the opponent and invest 
resources to protect them» (Hegre et al., 2007: 5). 
line, it is unlikely to generate any warfare 
benefits, or to change the military balance of 
power9. In this context, violence is only ratio-
nal if aimed at eliminating potential threats in 
the rearguards, and if these threats are repre-
sented by mobilized supporters of the enemy 
—those who could constitute «fifth columns» 
or challenge the control of the territory.
In order to generate a clear set of hypo-
theses, let’s imagine a hypothetical country 
where a civil war has erupted after a period 
of intense political confrontation between po-
litical parties A and B, whose platforms are 
now championed by respective armed 
groups, A and B. The citizenry of this country 
has been mobilized along the A-B cleavage. 
The two groups, which fight a conventional 
war with relatively stable frontlines, enjoy ex-
clusive military control of relatively large areas 
from which they have excluded the rival 
group. According to the definition of CCW, 
one group has full control over a relatively lar-
ge area of territory, whereas the other group 
cannot gain access unless it wins battles and 
proceeds to militarily conquer. Relevant inte-
ractions in the territory controlled by A invol-
ve combatants of this group and all civilians 
living in it. In addition to confronting B on the 
battlefield in order to increase the share of 
territory under its control, A is interested in 
getting rid of strong supporters of B (hereaf-
ter, also BSS), who are perceived as a poten-
tial threat. The group can do this by means of 
direct violence (i.e. executions) or indirect 
violence (i.e. bombings). With respect to di-
rect violence, the group will perpetrate it in 
the territory where it has territorial control; 
indirect violence, in contrast, will be perpetra-
ted in areas where the group has no territorial 
control, but which it can reach with bombs10. 
9 As is exemplifi ed by many instances during the Amer-
ican Civil War, restraint is also an option for armed groups 
(Neely, 2007).
10 It makes no sense for groups to bomb territories under 
their own control, as this would harm their infrastructures 
and resources.
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Within the territory controlled by A, spatial 
variation of direct violence (i.e. across locali-
ties) depends not only on the groups’ incen-
tives to target the localities, but also on the 
degree of civilian collaboration the groups 
find at the local level. The latter makes violen-
ce more or less possible —this is especially 
the case where groups do not have local in-
formation (e.g. where the perpetrators are not 
from the locality). Thus, the extent to which 
groups perpetrate violence in those locations 
where they have an interest in pursuing it (i.e. 
where strong supporters of the enemy are 
identified) is constrained by civilian agency. 
Because in a mobilized context political mo-
tives prime the decisions of civilians, and be-
cause civilians are rational and strategic, di-
rect violence peaks in places with higher 
levels of political competition and/or a more 
even balance of power between groups. In 
these places, local civilians strategically push 
for killings —in other words, they enhance the 
lethal actions of the group—, for this is likely 
to generate a change in the local state of 
affairs (to their benefit), and this does not en-
danger them (Balcells, 2010; 2011). 
At the same time, as this is a CCW, we 
can assume that B (like A) is a well-equipped 
armed group, which has heavy artillery 
allowing shelling from land (in places close to 
the frontline), sea (in places close to the seas-
hore), and air (presumably, anywhere). In 
addition to using this technological capacity 
to attack A on the frontlines and/or in milita-
rily strategic enclaves, B can choose to de-
ploy some of its resources to attack civilian 
locations in A’s rearguard. These attacks, 
while barbaric, can be perpetrated on a se-
lective basis; that is, the group may decide to 
kill civilians in a particular locality and not 
another11. B is likely to attack places hosting 
strong supporters of the enemy group, i.e. 
11 This choice will very often be necessary for armed 
groups because their resources are not unlimited. Fur-
thermore, genocide is not always in the strategic interest 
of the military leaders (Valentino et al. 2004). 
ASS. Given the degree of imprecision of indi-
rect types of attacks such as bombings, B 
can only make sure that they are targeting 
ASS by attacking locations with a relatively 
large share of these supporters. Hence, if we 
conceptualize the degree of support for a 
group —and therefore the relative number of 
strong supporters— in a locality with the level 
of electoral support for the group during the 
period preceding the civil war, we can hypo-
thesize that the greater the prewar electoral 
support for a group, the greater the likelihood 
that a locality will be the target of lethal indi-
rect violence by the enemy group. In civil 
wars fought along ethnic or religious lines, 
the demographic characteristics of munici-
palities (i.e. percentage of members of groups 
living in them) can be also useful indicators of 
the degree of support for the armed groups, 
and therefore predictors of the likelihood 
that they will be targeted with indirect vio-
lence.
Despite the existence of stable frontlines, 
in wartime contexts, information on violent 
events (e.g. regarding the brutality of attacks) 
is likely to spread across the territory. Refu-
gee flows have usually been a source of in-
formation about events occurring on the 
other side of the frontline (in recent times, 
mass media do the job). At the same time, 
during CCW, armed groups might be interes-
ted in sending signals to their own consti-
tuencies or supporters, in order to maintain 
their support and enhance mobilization (Gag-
non, 2004). For this reason, armed groups 
might be interested in attacking specific loca-
tions in the enemy’s rearguard in order to re-
taliate for the previous killings of their su-
pporters (i.e. in a place where their supporters 
are widely known to have been repressed). 
These retaliatory attacks, explained by what 
I call «emotional motives», can be expected 
to take place in non-initial phases of the civil 
war, and to become more frequent as the war 
goes on and as direct violence by the rival 
group continues to take place.
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Additional Observable Implications
In a framework where armed groups are targe-
ting civilians with the intention of cleansing rear-
guard areas of strong enemies, we may assu-
me that the group will have an interest in 
eliminating strong supporters of the enemy re-
gardless of their place of origin. Areas hosting 
internally displaced people who are associated 
with the rival group, B (e.g. civilians who are 
fleeing from areas that are occupied by A), may 
be more targeted (directly and indirectly) by A 
because of this. Although theorizing about dis-
placement is beyond the scope of this paper, 
targeting internally displaced people is an im-
plication of the above model —where political 
identities are an informational shortcut for ar-
med groups. Steele (2010) has observed, for 
example, that in the civil war in Colombia mas-
sacres by the paramilitary were more likely in 
locations with a greater density of internally dis-
placed people (IDPs), e.g. people who have fled 
from paramilitary control zones. At the same 
time, this behavior of armed groups may also 
stem from a strategic type of framework; for 
example, groups may be sending a signal to 
their own constituents, persuading them to stay 
on their side and deterring them from fleeing. 
Finally, with these kinds of attacks, armed 
groups may reduce the degree of support that 
refugees show toward the other side, which 
comes across as unable to protect them 
(Kalyvas, 2006)12. 
To wrap up, in the context of a conventional 
civil war, armed groups —equipped with heavy 
weaponry— are likely to perpetrate indirect vio-
lence in zones outside their territorial control in 
order to pursue military objectives; this will im-
ply the targeting of geostrategic enclaves (e.g. 
big cities, harbors, communication nodes, etc.). 
However, political and emotional factors are 
12 In other words, by attacking IDPs, groups might not 
only be sweeping the rear territories of potential enemies, 
but also manipulating civilian emotions in their favour (i.e. 
provoking fear and terror in order to prevent defection 
and flight from the area under control). 
also likely to play a role, leading groups to 
attack places with a greater density of poten-
tially strong enemies, as well as places that 
have victimized their supporters in previous 
stages of the war. Finally, we can assume that 
groups will be interested in indirectly targeting 
locations with a greater density of internally dis-
placed people, driven by a combination of po-
litical, emotional and strategic motives. The 
inclusion of political and emotional factors 
makes the theoretical framework here slightly 
broader than that of the existing literature, 
which has focused either on military factors 
(Pape, 1996), bargaining considerations and/or 
the military balance of power between groups 
(Hultman, 2007; Boyle, 2009; Vargas, 2008), or 
on a combination of military and political fac-
tors, but which has left emotional variables out 
of the picture (Kocher et al., 2011).
empIrIcs
In the previous section, I introduced a set of 
hypotheses on the determinants of indirect 
violence during conventional civil wars. In ge-
neral terms, I have argued that, in addition to 
foreseeing military advantages, armed 
groups are likely to bomb places politically 
dominated by their enemy in order to maxi-
mize the probability of eliminating strong 
enemies. Furthermore, I have tentatively ar-
gued that, as the war develops, emotional 
factors gain relevance in explaining bom-
bings; this makes the localities where civi-
lians (i.e. A’s supporters) have been victimi-
zed by the enemy (i.e. B) more likely to be 
targeted (i.e. by A). These types of factors 
obviously come into play once the civil war 
has been going on for some time, and once 
other forms of violence (i.e. executions) have 
already taken place in the localities. 
I will use evidence from the Spanish Civil 
War in order to test these hypotheses. The 
Spanish Civil War began as a military coup 
against a legally constituted democratic go-
vernment. It lasted for almost three years (18 
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July 1936-1 April 1939) and generated around 
800,000 deaths and over 440,000 externally 
displaced13. It took place between two main 
political blocs: 1) the army of the Republican 
government, or Loyalists, which also inclu-
ded militias of political parties, trade unions, 
and the International Brigades. I include all of 
them under the label of «the Left», even 
though there were important differences bet-
ween them, including intense rivalries that 
eventually led to violent clashes; 2) the army 
of the rebels (Francoists or Nationalists), 
which also included factions of the regular 
army and various militias; I include them all 
under the label of «the Right». 
During the war, the Right perpetrated indi-
rect violence, mainly through aerial bombings, 
and they did so more extensively than the Left. 
The intervention of the Condor Legion and 
Mussolini’s military forces, which, it has been 
said, were testing their equipment before 
WWII (Payne, 2010), contributed to this. Besi-
des being used for military purposes, bom-
bings of rearguard territories have usually 
been considered randomly (i.e. non-systema-
tically) distributed across localities, their only 
aim being to induce terror among the popula-
tion: «Bombing raids on Spanish cities such as 
Madrid and Barcelona were often undertaken 
without any military targets in mind, but simply 
to frighten the Republican population into sub-
mission» (Leitz, 1999: 130). It is beyond dis-
cussion that, in the perpetration of indirect 
attacks, agency corresponded to the main 
commanders of each army. In fact, despite the 
alliance with the Italian and German armies, 
Franco kept close control over the actions of 
these foreign armed forces14. The General 
13 Data on total deaths during the civil war is still incom-
plete, and various historians are involved in debates 
about estimations (Salas, 1977; Martín Rubio, 1997; Pres-
ton, 1986; Torres, 2002; Juliá, 2004). Hence, the figure 
corresponding to deaths should be taken as a rough 
estimate. Data on refugees is also very fragmentary, and 
should be viewed with caution. 
14 Here I shall not enter into the debate on the attribution 
of responsibilities for specific attacks, e.g. the slaughter 
would decide whether to bomb rearguard ci-
ties (full of civilians) or not: «During the years 
1937 and 1938, Franco gave the order not to 
bomb any urban center without his explicit 
consent» (Solé i Sabaté and Villarroya, 2003: 
78). No civilian agency is attributed to these 
attacks, although sometimes local «fifth co-
lumnists» would be crucial by giving instruc-
tions to military commanders on the time of 
day and the location where most civilians 
would be congregated (e.g. in the attack of the 
city of , in Catalonia, on May 31st 1938, as in-
dicated by several testimonies15). 
Several primary and secondary sources 
on the Spanish Civil War suggest that targe-
ting was largely based on the political loyal-
ties of individuals. In relation to this matter, 
there is more qualitative evidence concerning 
direct rather than indirect violence; indeed, I 
have not found any official military files expli-
citly resolving bombing locations based on 
the political identities of their citizens16. 
However, there is some secondary historical 
evidence supporting the hypothesis that po-
litical alignments were crucial to the perpetra-
tion of indirect violence. For example, in the 
city of Madrid, no bombs affected the «con-
servative» neighborhood of Salamanca as a 
result of explicit orders from Franco (Solé i 
Sabaté and Villarroya, 2003: 56). Something 
similar happened in the city of Barcelona 
(Roig, 2007). More indirectly, Llaó reports a 
conversation with a man who learned about 
the bombing of the locality of El Perelló by 
Fascist forces, which seemed somewhat 
«puzzling» because the location was not stra-
tegic from a military point of view. «The man 
committed in Guernica by the Condor Legion. For a de-
tailed account of this attack, see, among others, Solé i 
Sabaté and Villarroya (2003:82-92) or Vidal (1997).
15 Anonymous Interviewees. Personal communication, 
April 2007.
16 In any case, according to Neely (2007), if we seek to 
understand the causes of violence, it is more helpful to 
look at actual violence rather than to examine archives 
on grand military strategy, which may misreport real vio-
lence.
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asked, ‘Who won the elections of 16 February 
1936?’ When we answered that the Left had 
won, he replied, ‘Well bombed it is, then’» 
(Llaó, 2006: 9). 
Obviously, the qualitative evidence above 
is not sufficient to validate the hypotheses. In 
this section, I perform a fine-grained empiri-
cal test with data on violence from all 1,062 
municipalities of Catalonia in 1936. The re-
gion of Catalonia is located in the northeast 
of the Iberian Peninsula; it is delimited by the 
Mediterranean Sea to the East, and it has 
borders with France and Andorra to the north 
and with the Spanish region of Aragon to the 
west. Catalonia was under Republican con-
trol during most of the war, and it was con-
quered by the Nationalist army in an offensive 
that began immediately after the Nationalist 
victory in the Battle of the Ebro (July-Novem-
ber 1938) (Reverte, 2006)17. As the Nationa-
list army advanced in 1938, it conquered 
Lleida and some parts of the western areas 
of Catalonia, which were «combat zones» for 
a while. One of the most affected areas was 
Terra Alta, in the southwest, as well as parts 
of the midwest (Pallars Jussà, Segrià, Nogue-
ra, Alta Ribagorça). The use of aerial attacks 
combined with well-organized land forces 
made it a ferocious occupation, leading to 
the surrender of Catalonia on 13 February 
1939. Direct violence took place in Catalonia 
in two stages: initially (from July 1936 to 
1938/39), violence was perpetrated by leftist 
militias and the Republican army; subse-
quently (during and after its occupation of the 
territories), violence was perpetrated by the 
Nationalist army and right-wing militias18. As 
for indirect violence, this took place in the 
17 During the SCW, one of the most stable frontlines was 
the one created along the Ebro River, which divided the 
region of Aragon into two sides. Few localities close to 
the Ebro frontline were conquered by the Nationalists in 
mid-1938; the first Catalan town to be occupied by the 
Nationalist army was Lleida (3 April 1938).
18 Rightist violence did not only take place during war-
time, but lasted several years after the war. 
form of aerial bombings by the Nationalists 
from 1936 until they occupied the region19. 
I use data only for the region of Catalonia 
because this is the only territory of Spain for 
which I have been able to collect fine-grained 
(i.e. municipal-level) data on bombings, as 
well as on the number of casualties as a con-
sequence of strikes20. We can assume that 
the patterns observed in this region are, 
however, generalizable to other areas of 
Spain, as well as to other countries experien-
cing conventional civil wars. There are no 
reasons to think that the dynamics explaining 
spatial variation in bombings should be diffe-
rent in this territory vis-à-vis others. In fact, 
the qualitative evidence seems to suggest 
that these were quite similar (e.g. selective 
bombings of Madrid neighborhoods by the 
Nationalist army resemble those in Barcelo-
na). Also, the strategy of using micro-level 
data on violence in a single country —or a 
single region in a country— has already pro-
ved useful in comparative research (e.g. 
19 In Catalonia, bombings were perpetrated by the Na-
tionalist army, helped by the Fascist air forces of Italy 
and Germany. While the Republican army also bombed 
localities within the territory of Catalonia, this happened 
almost exclusively in places located on the war frontline, 
or in places affected by battles at the end of the military 
struggle (Solé i Sabaté and Villarroya, 1987). Specifi-
cally, these locations were: Gandesa, Horta de Sant Joan, 
Móra d’Ebre, Valls, Serós, Sort (Solé i Sabaté and Villar-
roya, 1986). In the analyses here, these Republican 
bombings will not be taken into account.
20 Solé i Sabaté and Villarroya (1986) have collected lo-
cal level data on number of bombings (disaggregated by 
date), as well as on number of lethal casualties directly 
linked to these attacks. These authors have used differ-
ent primary sources: all the civil registers in Catalonia; 
Defense Council of Catalonia (Junta de Defensa Pasiva 
de Cataluña) documentation —located in the National 
Archive of the Spanish Civil War in Salamanca; local ar-
chives and newspapers published at the time. The trian-
gulation method pursued by these historians offers us a 
great deal of reliability. There are no similar sources of 
data for the other regions of Spain. While Maldonado 
(2006) provides us with some data on bombings in Ara-
gon, which amounted to circa 2,000 strikes, the data 
were not collected systematically enough to be able to 
perform reliable statistical tests with them. I have coded 
bombings such that each event may include a whole 
military operation, which may imply more than one strike. 
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Kalyvas, 2006; Lyall, 2009). Since I am using 
a significant number of cases within this re-
gion, the results have internal validity.
I have argued that indirect violence in a 
rearguard territory of a CCW is likely to be de-
termined by a combination of factors: military, 
political, and emotional. For the sake of ope-
rationalization, and given that I lack better in-
dicators, I will use geo-referencing variables 
(i.e. latitude, longitude, altitude) to measure 
the «military value» of the localities. These 
should be suitable indicators insofar as the 
military importance of a place is connected 
with its geographical location and terrain (i.e. 
altitude). I will also include the size of the loca-
lity (proxied by the Population variable and 
with a dummy for urban centers) in order to 
account for the presence of industrial resour-
ces. In addition, we can assume that more 
populated locations are more likely to be tar-
geted if the armed group intends to morally 
depress the enemy (Friedrich, 2006). I will in-
corporate different indicators of the political 
characteristics of the municipalities, including 
political competition, trade union affiliation, or 
percentage of support for the political blocs. 
According to my theoretical framework, mea-
sures of political domination —but not of poli-
tical competition— should be significant in 
explaining indirect violence. As far as emotio-
nal factors are concerned, I will use number of 
executions by the rival group (i.e. the Left) in a 
locality in order to proxy desire for retaliation 
(i.e. by the Right)21. The hypotheses will be 
tested through the estimation of logit, OLS, 
and negative binomial (NB) regressions22. The 
results are displayed in two parts: a first set of 
analyses is run with a model including the mi-
21 Again, since the factors explaining executions by the 
Left are different to those explaining bombings by the 
Right, there should be no endogeneity issues. 
22 NB is an appropriate model for event count type of 
data (i.e. number of bombardments); logit allows us to 
estimate the probability of a locality being targeted; OLS 
allow for the estimation of the number of deaths in bomb-
ings. 
litary and political variables as the main corre-
lates; a second set of analyses adds the so-
called emotional variables to the first model. 
Figure 1 depicts the distribution of people 
killed in Nationalist bombings in Catalonia, 
during the entire Spanish Civil War. It can be 
observed that the places with the most fata-
lities were predominantly urban locations on 
the coastline23, locations close to the French 
border, or locations near the Ebro frontline (in 
the west), where battalions of soldiers or spa-
re troops were positioned during the Battle of 
the Ebro (July-November 1938). People living 
in urban centers such as Barcelona and Ta-
rragona were the most victimized24. 
Nonetheless, it must be noted that there 
were also several strikes that took place in 
non-coastal localities which did not have ma-
jor military or energy industries and thus do 
not match this geostrategic type of variable. 
This suggests that bombings might be ex-
plained by not only strategic, but also politi-
cal and emotional factors. 
The first general econometric model that 
will be used to test the hypotheses is the fo-
llowing25:
Econometric Model 1. Indirect Violence 
(Political Factors)
Bombingi= 
a + wSupportLefti + bXi + mi
23 Sea positions were attacked mainly for strategic rea-
sons (e.g. in order to impede communications, sea trans-
portation, and the like) (Solé i Sabaté and Villarroya 1986; 
2003b). They were also easily targeted from ships or the 
Balearic Islands; for example, in mid-May 1938, the Ital-
ian garrisons in Mallorca bombed Barcelona, causing 980 
fatalities (Payne, 2010: 481).
24 Barcelona was hit by 212 strikes; Tarragona by 89. 
The greater degree of population density in these mu-
nicipalities aggravated the lethality of the aerial attacks. 
25 I will use different versions of the dependent variable 
(e.g. % deaths in bombings; number of bombings during 
the entire civil war; bombings disaggregated by years), 
to run different versions of the econometric model 1. I 
will use OLS, logit or NB depending on the nature of the 
dependent va riable. 
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First, I run a logit model with the depen-
dent variable Bombdum, a dummy with value 
1 if the locality suffered a strike that resulted in 
at least one civilian death and 0 otherwise. By 
taking out bombings that involved no civilian 
deaths, I eliminate those attacks that were ai-
med purely at infrastructures, roads and har-
bors, thereby «cleaning» the dependent varia-
ble. Support Left measures % support for the 
left-wing bloc in the 1936 elections; this varia-
ble is expected to have a positive effect on 
bombings that were perpetrated by Nationalist 
forces. Xi includes a number of independent 
and control variables: Longitude and Latitude 
are included as proxies of the military and 
geostrategic value of a locality, although we 
do not have theoretical priors on the direction 
of their effect. Regarding Latitude, I would ex-
pect bombings to increase with proximity to 
the French border due to the strategic impor-
tance of cross-border locations; however, as 
the Battle of the Ebro affected mainly southern 
territories, it is not clear that bombings should 
increase with Latitude. Something similar ha-
ppens with Longitude because, on the one 
hand, greater longitude in Catalonia implies 
greater proximity to the sea (and, as we have 
seen, greater proximity to the sea implies both 
greater interest and further opportunities for 
targeting). However, lesser longitude also im-
plies greater proximity to the war frontline, and 
this should also enhance bombardments dri-
ven by military factors. In relation to Altitude, I 
expect higher (and therefore more mountai-
nous) locations to be less relevant from a mili-
taristic perspective, and therefore less prone 
to being targeted; more mountainous loca-
tions are more isolated, and less likely to be 
crucial communication nodes or industrial 
centers26. Population allows us to control for 
26 In the regressions, the inclusion of the variable Altitude 
makes us lose a significant number of cases (18% of 
them). Yet, if we run this same regression without this 
variable (i.e. with a total of 1,062 cases), the results do 
not change.
FIGURE 1.  Deaths in Bombings, Catalonia (1936-1939)
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size or degree of urbanization of a locality, 
which should have a positive effect on bom-
bings. I also include a dummy for urban cen-
ters (Urban), which are localities that had 
more than 5,000 inhabitants in 1936. CNT 
Affiliation, UGT Affiliation and Catholic Center 
are included as additional proxies for the pre-
sence of strong supporters of either the Left 
or the Right in the locality. In this respect, I 
expect CNT and UGT affiliation to have a po-
sitive effect, and Catholic Center a negative 
effect on bombings.
I test for the alternative hypothesis that po-
litical competition —and not political domina-
tion by the enemy party− explains the likeliho-
od of a locality being bombed. This will allow 
us to reject the hypothesis that the factors ac-
counting for indirect violence are the same as 
those accounting for direct violence (Balcells, 
2010a). For this purpose, I include Competi-
tion in a second regression model (M2). Comp 
Abs (Competition index measured with abso-
lute values) is included in a third model (M3). 
Furthermore, I run a fourth model including % 
Support Left measured with data from the 
1933 elections (M4), which should provide fur-
ther robustness to the results.
In a second econometric model, I take 
into account not only strategic or political 
factors, but also factors endogenous to war, 
which should allow us to capture the so-ca-
lled emotional factors. Specifically, in this 
model, executions by the Left in a locality are 
included in the vector of independent varia-
bles; I expect these to generate reprisals by 
the Nationalist army and therefore have a po-
sitive impact on bombings27. 
Econometric Model 2. Indirect violence 
(Political and Emotional Factors)
Bombingi = 
a + wSupportLefti + dExecuted Lefti + bXi + mi
27 It is important to note that Executed Left is not cor-
related with Support Left (Balcells, 2010a; 2010b).
I will test this model with different depen-
dent variables: total number of bombings, 
and bombings in particular years of the Civil 
War (i.e. 1937, 1938 and 1939). This will allow 
us to determine whether the weight of emo-
tional factors changes as the war progresses.
Military and Political Variables
I first explore the determinants of a locality 
being targeted at any time during the conflict 
with bombings that caused at least one civi-
lian death. Thus, I estimate models 1 to 4 with 
the dependent variable Bombdum. The re-
sults are depicted in Table 1.
The results in M1 of Table I show that —
controlling for all other variables in the mo-
del— % support for the Left in the 1936 elec-
tions has a significant positive effect on the 
likelihood of a locality suffering from a lethal 
bombardment. UGT Affiliation takes a positive 
and significant sign, thus indicating that the 
Right was more likely to indirectly attack pla-
ces with a greater proportion of militants of 
this trade union. CNT Affiliation has a negative 
sign, contrary to our expectations (the size of 
the coefficient is, however, substantively very 
small, no different from zero). As expected, 
Altitude has a negative effect on the likelihood 
of bombings. Catholic Center is not statistica-
lly significant, thus not supporting the hypo-
thesis that enclaves of the Right such as reli-
gious centers were less targeted than other 
localities. Longitude takes a negative sign, in-
dicating that western locations were more 
likely to be targeted; this is consistent with the 
fact that localities closer to the Ebro frontline 
were more relevant strategically; Latitude, in 
contrast, has no significant effect on bom-
bings. Population has a positive and very sig-
nificant and strong effect on lethal bombings, 
also supporting the idea that more densely 
populated locations were more likely to be tar-
geted by bombings. The dummy for Urban 
locations is not statistically significant.
Figure 2 depicts the predicted likelihood of 
bombing by levels of support for the Left (all 
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other variables in the regression are set at their 
mean level). We can observe that the marginal 
impact of this variable is substantially non-
negligible. Specifically, as we can see in Table 
A2 of the Appendix, a unit increase in the stan-
dard deviation in this variable increases the 
probability of lethal bombing by 29.3%.
In Table 1, none of the alternative indepen-
dent variables (in models M2, M3 and M4) 
appears as significant in explaining bombings. 
Importantly, the non-significance of Competi-
tion and CompAbs allows us to rule out the 
hypothesis that indirect violence is explained 
by the same factors that account for direct 
violence (Balcells, 2010a, 2011). The results of 
M4 indicate that 1933 political alignments do 
not explain indirect wartime violence; although 
this variable takes a positive sign, as expec-
ted, it is not statistically significant. 
Table 2 depicts the results of a set of OLS 
regressions with total number of people killed 
in bombings (per thousand inhabitants) as 
the dependent variable28. 
28 Given that the dependent variable is normalized here, 
I do not include Population in the vector of independent 
variables.
TABLE 1.   Logit on Lethal Bombing (Bombdum)
 M1 M2 M3 M4
Population (*1000) 0.694*** 0.716*** 0.719*** 0.726***
 (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25)
CNT Affiliation –0.002*** –0.002*** –0.002*** –0.002***
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
UGT Affiliation 0.178** 0.186** 0.186** 0.186**
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Urban –1.125 -1.161 –1.166 –1.195
 (1.20) (1.22) (1.22) (1.22)
Catholic Center 1.655 1.322 1.339 1.423
 (1.61) (1.60) (1.61) (1.58)
Longitude (*1000) –0.005** –0.006*** –0.006*** –0.006***
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Latitude (*1000) 0.005 0.007* 0.007* 0.007*
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Altitude (*1000) –1.227** –1.461*** –1.468*** –1.389**
 (0.54) (0.55) (0.55) (0.55)
Support Left 1936 0.015**   
 (0.01)   
Competition  0.889  
  (0.73)  
CompAbs    0.497 
   (0.52) 
Support Left 1933    0.005
    (0.01)
Constant –24.500 –31.748** –31.144** –30.554*
 (15.85) (15.84) (15.86) (15.72)
Observations 870 870 870 866
Chi2 57.519 44.212 43.477 43.196
 Robust standard errors in brackets
 Sig. Level: *.1 **.05 *** .001
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Consistent with the results in Table 1, 
the coefficient for Support Left is positive 
and statistically significant. The remaining 
variables take similar signs and statistical 
significance, as compared to the previous 
table. One difference is that Urban is now 
statistically significant, indicating that ci-
vilians in urban centers were disproportio-
nally killed by bombings, as expected. 
Also, Competition in this model is statisti-
cally significant at 90%, taking a positive 
sign29. 
Table 3 depicts the results of an NB spe-
cification regressing number of bombings 
during the entire Civil War (Total Bombings) 
on the same set of variables. The results are 
highly consistent with those in Table 1, and 
they support the hypothesis that political do-
mination (and not competition) by the enemy 
group accounts for indirect targeting of loca-
lities. Indeed, Support Left is highly signifi-
cant in M1, while Competition and CompAbs 
29 This goes against our expectations, but it does not 
seem to be a very robust result, as it disappears in all 
the other analyses.
are not statistically significant. The remaining 
coefficients take similar values to those in Ta-
bles 1 and 2.
All in all, the results in this sub-section 
indicate that bombings of localities during a 
CCW are explained by both military and po-
litical factors, as hypothesized. On the one 
hand, the results of the different regression 
models indicate that geography of a location 
(e.g. proximity to the sea, proximity to the 
French border or to the frontline, altitude), 
which is associated with military strategic 
and tactical factors, is relevant in explaining 
indirect violence. Size of locality, which is 
connected with urbanization and industriali-
zation, and —during wartime- with weapon 
manufacturing and storage, also has a posi-
tive impact on bombings. With regard to po-
litical factors, we observe not only a mono-
tonic positive relationship between support 
for the Left in the 1936 elections and bom-
bings, but also that those places with higher 
levels of UGT affiliation are more likely to su-
ffer lethal bombardments. Finally, Competi-
tion is generally not significant in explaining 
indirect violence, as predicted.
FIGURE 2.  Predicted Likelihood of Lethal Bombings, by % Support Left 1936
[Key: grey lines depict 95% confidence interval]
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Emotional Variables
Bombing civilians could have been an instru-
ment for Francoist military authorities to punish 
localities where the anarchists and other militia-
men had dealt severely with the rightists, na-
mely a form of collective retaliation. As mentio-
ned previously, armed groups may be interested 
in satisfying domestic audiences (i.e. in their 
own rearguards), and they may be willing to be 
compliant with their emotions, including those 
related to revenge30. Qualitative evidence re-
garding this hypothesis is rather scarce, mainly 
30 Abellà argues that in the rearguard territories of Spain, 
astonishment was the predominant feeling among the 
population, but that this feeling gradually became more 
violent (1973: 58).
because of the absence of official reports ma-
king explicit the motives underlying the deci-
sion to bomb. Nonetheless, I have found some 
illustrative evidence in secondary sources; for 
example, in the county of La Cerdanya, the lo-
calities of Puigcerdà and Alp, where the anar-
chist militias had been brutal against rightist 
people were targets of bombardments that tur-
ned out to be very deadly. Indirect violence ba-
rely affected the nearby town of Bellver, where 
the militiamen had not killed anyone. According 
to a local historian, «The bombs were falling 
into the river. Maybe they [the Nationalists] did 
not have much interest in killing people»31.
31 Anonymous Interviewee. Personal communication, 
February 2007.
TABLA 2.  OLS on ‰ Killed in Bombings
 M1 M2 M3 M4
CNT Affiliation  –0.000* –0.000 –0.000 –0.000
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
UGT Afiliation 0.185* 0.189* 0.189* 0.191*
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Urban 2.670** 2.738** 2.742** 2.765**
 (1.31) (1.31) (1.31) (1.31)
Catholic Center –0.315 –0.410 –0.403 –0.187
 (1.07) (1.07) (1.07) (1.06)
Longitude (*1000) –0.001 –0.001 –0.001 –0.001
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Latitude (*1000) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Altitude (*1000) –0.454** –0.530*** –0.544*** –0.537***
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
Support Left 1936 0.006***   
 (0.00)   
Competition  0.354*  
  (0.19)  
CompAbs    0.134 
   (0.18) 
Support Left1933    0.002
    (0.00)
Constant –7.097 –9.720 –9.441 –9.848
 (7.73) (7.66) (7.64) (7.69)
    
Observations 870 870 870 866
 Robust standard errors in brackets.
 Sig Level: *.1 **.05 *** .001
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In Table 4, I present the results of different 
NB models, one for each of the different de-
pendent variables: number of bombings in 
each year (1937; 1938; 1939), and total num-
ber of bombings affecting a locality during 
the entire Civil War. In addition to the inde-
pendent and control variables in the models 
above, Executed Left is included in the vector 
of explanatory variables. We expect this va-
riable, a proxy for retaliation, to have a posi-
tive effect. 
In Table 4, we can observe that Executed 
Left has a positive effect on bombings taking 
place in 1939, as well as on total number of 
bombings in a locality32. It does not have an 
effect on bombings taking place in 1937 and 
1938. Retaliation is thus shown to have an 
impact on bombings only in the later stages 
of the Civil War, which makes sense. Also, the 
effect of retaliation does not rule out the 
32 Executed Left is not disaggregated by years (unfortu-
nately, I have not been able to find these type of data); 
this means that the same figures are counted for each 
year. In this sense, it is interesting to see that the relative 
effect of direct killings is lagged, as it increases with the 
years.
TABLE 3.  NB on Total Bombings
 M1 M2 M3 M4
Population (*1000) 0.088*** 0.092*** 0.092*** 0.093***
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
CNT Afiliation  –0.001*** –0.001*** –0.001*** –0.001***
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
UGT Afiliation  0.158 0.199 0.200 0.197
 (0.12) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14)
Urban 2.740*** 3.048*** 3.026*** 3.083***
 (0.51) (0.57) (0.57) (0.60)
Catholic Center –0.331 –0.760 –0.731 –0.659
 (0.75) (0.85) (0.84) (0.87)
Longitude (*1000) 0.000 –0.001 –0.001 –0.001
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Latitude (*1000) –0.001 0.003 0.002 0.003
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Altitude (*1000) –2.244*** –2.940*** –2.913*** –2.889***
 (0.57) (0.62) (0.62) (0.63)
Support Left 1936 0.028***   
 (0.01)   
Competition  –0.188  
  (0.85)  
CompAbs    –0.374 
   (0.57) 
Support Left 1933    0.004
    (0.01)
Constant 1.426 –11.956 –10.674 –13.263
 (15.84) (16.98) (16.93) (17.45)
Lnalpha 1.443*** 1.544*** 1.538*** 1.560***
 (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18)
Observations 870 870 870 866
Chi2 182.506 142.809 141.726 144.286
 Robust standard errors in brackets
 Sig Level: *.1 **.05 *** .001 
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effect of Support Left, which remains subs-
tantively and statistically significant across all 
the models. Except for Population, which lo-
ses statistical significance, the coefficients 
for the remaining variables take similar values 
and signs to those in the regressions above.
A caveat: one could argue that the rela-
tionship observed in the two last models of 
Table 4 was in fact the reverse; that direct 
killings were the consequence and not the 
cause of indirect violence. In fact, in several 
historical accounts (Preston, 1986; Solé i Sa-
baté and Villarroya, 1989, 2003) it is argued 
that aerial bombardments affecting their rear-
guards sometimes made the groups perpe-
trate direct violence against civilians. These 
cases of retaliation very often involved the 
execution of prisoners (in the so-called sa-
cas) (Payne, 2010: 476). This is what happe-
ned, for example, on the ship Aragon, where 
prisoners were being held by the Republican 
army: «As a result of a bombardment of the 
Nationalist air force over Mahón, all the priso-
ners in the ship, even the doctors, were exe-
cuted in reprisal» (Moreno de Alborán and 
Moreno de Alborán, 1998: 239)33. Based on 
33 On some occasions, it would seem that these re-
taliations were not even well founded; for example, a 
report of the Toledo Directorate General for Security 
TABLE 4.  NB on Total Bombings, with Executed Left
 
1937 1938 1939
 Total
    Bombs
Population (*1000) 0.073** 0.004 0.031 –0.007
 (0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06)
CNT Affiliation –0.000*** –0.000* –0.001** –0.000**
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
UGT Affiliation –0.033 0.136 0.110*** 0.129
 (0.06) (0.12) (0.03) (0.08)
Urban 2.683*** 2.749*** 1.988*** 2.666***
 (0.45) (0.63) (0.46) (0.49)
Catholic Center 0.681 –2.016 –2.509 –2.322*
 (1.20) (1.74) (1.55) (1.24)
Latitude (*1000) –0.006 –0.004 0.014*** 0.001
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Longitude (*1000) 0.010 0.002 –0.006 –0.001
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Altitude (*1000) –17.115*** –3.326*** 0.171 –2.366***
 (4.59) (0.84) (0.74) (0.56)
Support Left 1936 0.037*** 0.030*** 0.023*** 0.030***
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Killed Left –0.000 0.018 0.029* 0.022*
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Constant –47.485 –11.079 19.336 0.157
 (40.89) (19.37) (25.73) (16.42)
Lnalpha 0.830 1.793 1.191 1.438
 (0.39) (0.24) (0.38) (0.17)
Observations 870 870 870 870
Chi2 291.133 151.455 650.408 203.054
 Robust standard errors in brackets
 Sig. Level: *.1 **.05 *** .001
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these historians’ insights, Herreros and Cria-
do (2009) have analyzed the effect of bom-
bings on leftist violence in Catalonia, and 
they have found a positive impact of bom-
bings on executions. However, it must be 
noted that the number of massacres carried 
out as a reprisal for aerial and naval bom-
bardments in Catalonia, as reported by histo-
rians, is quite limited, and concentrated on 
very specific dates: 30 October 1936, after 
the incursion of a war boat in the harbor of 
Roses, which led to a wave of killings across 
the territory; 16 November 1936 in Palamós; 
13 February 1937 in Barcelona (Solé i Sabaté 
and Villarroya, 2003)34. Moreover, as I have 
explained, the large majority of bombard-
ments in Catalonia were perpetrated after 
1936 —that is, after the largest share of leftist 
violence had taken place; this timing means 
that direct violence in this region is not a pos-
sible consequence of bombings35.
To wrap up, the results with data on bom-
bings in Catalonia generally support the idea 
that political factors, in addition to military 
factors, play a role in explaining indirect vio-
(Police) states that «around 80 people were taken out 
from the provincial prison during the night of 23 August 
1936, and were killed as a reprisal for the bombardment 
of the Red air force, which accidentally targeted the Red 
barricades» (Informe 4741, Causa General, Pieza 4, 
Checas, 1049/1).
34 Solé i Sabaté and Villarroya (2003: 64-73) detail all the 
cases of reprisal after bombardments in Spain.
35 In fact, if I run the same regression with Bombings 
(either total bombings or disaggregated by years) as 
an independent variable, and executions by the Left 
as the dependent variable, I obtain a significant «ef-
fect» of bombings on number of executions. (The 
estimates of the remaining independent variables do 
not change substantively). However, the fact that the 
coefficient is significant does not mean that it cap-
tures a causal relationship. I would argue that the test 
performed by Herreros and Criado (2009) would be 
more plausible regarding regions such as Mallorca, 
or Huesca and Zaragoza in Aragon, where the timing 
of the bombings and executions is more consistent 
with this type of account, and where historical ac-
counts are more supportive of the existence of these 
retaliatory executions (see Solé i Sabaté and Villar-
roya, 2003 or Ledesma, 2009 for further details on 
these types of executions). 
lence, especially in the early stages of a civil 
war. Emotional factors —which I have opera-
tionalized with previous direct violence by the 
rival group in a locality— also play a role, and 
their substantial impact increases as the war 
develops. This is consistent with a framework 
combining exogenous and endogenous va-
riables in explaining wartime victimization of 
civilians, which also accounts for direct vio-
lence (Balcells, 2010b).
The results here have connections with fin-
dings in previous research. For example, Ko-
cher et al. (2011) emphasize the relevance of 
political alignments at the local level in explai-
ning bombings. They provide evidence from 
Vietnam, an irregular civil war where what they 
describe as indiscriminate violence (empirica-
lly referring to bombings) tended to occur in 
political strongholds of one side or the other. 
These authors argue that in conventional con-
flicts indirect violence will take place only in 
the most contested zones of the battlefield; 
the findings here challenge this argument 
inasmuch as they show that indirect violence 
in conventional civil wars can also target rear-
guard civilian locations on the basis of political 
motives.
One implication of the theoretical fra-
mework set out above is that indirect violence 
will target places hosting IDPs —i.e. people 
who have left their control area and who the-
reby show strong loyalties to the rival group. 
Although not linked to indirect violence, re-
search on massacres in Colombia (Steele, 
2010) has provided some evidence along the-
se lines. For the particular case of Spain, some 
historians have pointed out that places with 
larger numbers of internally displaced people 
were more intensively victimized by the Right 
(e.g. Guernica, as argued by Vidal, 1997). A 
written testimony (in a magazine of the period: 
Sembrador) of a woman who left the city of 
Malaga, recounts how the Francoist army per-
secuted people as they left the city by bom-
bing them: «In the midst of a shrapnel rain, we 
took flight. Everyone in the city was looking for 
salvation because nobody in Malaga wanted 
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Fascism. The roads and fields were black, full 
of people... At least 150,000 were fleeing 
toward Almeria... we were persecuted by a 
squad of fighter planes that discharged shrap-
nel on us; we were defenseless». To test the 
implication that locations with larger number 
of IDPs are more likely to be targeted with in-
direct violence, I collected data on the total 
number of internally displaced persons living 
in a locality during different stages of the civil 
war36. With these data I tested, using the 
same empirical models above, the impact of 
the presence of these IDPs (measured with % 
of the population of the locality) on the likeli-
hood of a locality being bombed. I ran a logit 
regression on Bombdum, and a NB model on 
Bombings (both total and disaggregated by 
years, following Table 4). I included different 
specifications of the independent variable: la-
gged IDPs (% IDPs in the previous year), or 
IDPs of the same year. However, in none of the 
cases did this variable prove to be statistically 
significant, thus allowing us to reject this ob-
servable implication37. 
conclusIons
This article has presented a set of hypothe-
ses and empirical analyses on the determi-
nants of indirect violence in the rearguard 
territories of a conventional civil war. The re-
sults —based on the exploitation of a novel 
fine-grained dataset on Nationalist bombings 
in Catalonia during the Spanish Civil War— 
support the hypothesis that political domi-
nance by the enemy group has an impact on 
levels of indirect violence in a locality. This 
finding is consistent with previous research 
on other types of civil war (Kocher et al., 
2011). Competition, in contrast, does not 
appear to explain indirect violence, and I ar-
36 Source: Serrallonga (2004).
37 Due to the non-results and space limitations, I have 
not included these analyses here, but they are available 
upon request.
gue that this is because, unlike in the case of 
direct violence (Balcells, 2010a), civilian 
agency is irrelevant for bombings and similar 
indirect attacks. By means of indirect violen-
ce, armed groups unilaterally attack those 
localities that are politically dominated by the 
rival group, because in this way they maximi-
ze the elimination of strong enemy suppor-
ters, who represent a threat to their interests.
The results in this paper are relevant insofar 
as they demonstrate that political variables are 
crucial in accounting for bombings during 
CCW, and they are consistent with a theoretical 
framework that explains violence in these civil 
wars by emphasizing the determination of ar-
med groups to cleanse the rearguard territories 
of enemies, by all possible means. The findings 
in this article are also important from a theore-
tical perspective, as they shed light on the idea 
that the concept of indiscriminate violence, as 
defined in Kalyvas (2006), may be too blurred, 
and that selective violence can take place at 
the level of a community. As we have seen, 
qualitative evidence from the Spanish Civil War 
supports this insight; for example, regarding 
Nationalist bombings in Madrid (autumn-winter 
1936), «the neighborhood least affected by the 
bombs in Madrid was that of Salamanca, which 
was the one inhabited by many of the suppor-
ters of the rebellion. Franco gave instructions 
not to bomb it» (Solé i Sabaté and Villarroya, 
2003: 56). Finally, taken together, the results in 
this article also illustrate that, in addition to exo-
genous factors, bombings are influenced by 
the dynamics of the war —namely, direct ki-
llings perpetrated by the opposing group at 
local level—. This is consistent with a fra-
mework emphasizing the role of not only politi-
cal rivalry, but also emotions such as revenge 
in understanding civil war violence (Balcells, 
2010b).
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appendIx
TABLE A1. Distribution of Bombings in the Sample
Total 
Bombings 
Frequency Percentage
  0 915 86.16
  1 84 7.91
  2 22 2.07
  3 9 0.85
  4 12 1.13
  5 2 0.19
  7 5 0.47
  9 3 0.28
 11 1 0.09
 12 1 0.09
 13 2 0.19
 14 1 0.09
 15 1 0.09
 21 1 0.09
 39 1 0.09
 89 1 0.09
212 1 0.09
Total 1,062 100
TABLE A2.   Marginal Effects for M1 in la table 1 (Logit on Bombdum)
 B Z P > z % %StdX SDofX
Population 0.69*** 2.81 0.005 100.2 3.6e+08 21.74
CNT Affiliation  –0.002*** –2.89 0.004 –0.2 –99.4 3013.51
UGT Affiliation  0.18** 2.19 0.028 19.5 22.2 1.13
Urban –1.12 –0.94 0.349 –67.5 –16.5 0.16
Catholic Center 1.65 1.03 0.304 423.1 17.1 0.09
Longitude –0.005** –2.43 0.015 –0.5 –29.8 66.14
Latitude 0.005 1.43 0.153 0.5 26.6 46.09
Altitude –1.23** –2.27 0.023 –70.7 –32.2 0.32
Support Left 1936 0.02** 2.38 0.017 1.5 29.3 16.76
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